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Contrasting Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist Grounded 
Theory: Methodological and Philosophical Conflicts 
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University College Cork, Ireland 
 
Grounded Theory (GT) is an innovative research methodology, consisting of 
three prevailing traditions: Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT. 
Despite arising from the same root, and sharing a number of the original 
methodological techniques, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT have 
nevertheless diverged to such an extent that they are neither homogenous nor 
interchangeable methodologies. They are differentiated by contrasting 
philosophical frameworks and conflicting methodological directives. Through 
a careful analysis of the literature, the authors propose that the incongruity of 
the three GT traditions hinges on three principal and paramount 
demarcations: Firstly, their contending coding procedures; secondly, their 
opposing philosophical positions; and thirdly, their conflicting use of 
literature. The authors argue that these three areas of contention represent the 
quintessential distinction between the three GT traditions. Accordingly, this 
article will illustrate and contrast the contending coding conventions, uncover 
the underlying philosophical positions, and explore the contrasting uses of 
literature embedded within Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT. 
Keywords: Classic Grounded Theory, Straussian Grounded Theory, 
Constructivist Grounded Theory, Coding, Framework, Research Philosophy, 
Paradigms, Methodology, Differences between Grounded Theories, Grounded 
Theory Diagrams, Literature Reviews, Use of Literature 
  
Grounded Theory (GT) is an innovative methodology, consisting of three prevailing 
traditions: Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT. Despite their significant divergence, the 
three factions of grounded theorists claim the same origin and continue to embrace a number 
of the original methodological techniques penned by Glaser and Strauss in the original GT 
text, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967). A detailed background of this history is 
available in the authors’ previous article (Kenny & Fourie, 2014). Although this present 
article is concentrating on the distinctions which differentiate these three factions of GT, it is 
imperative to first acknowledge their points of methodological convergence and identify a 
number of the foundational GT concepts (as featured in the original Classic GT publication in 
1967), which Straussian and Constructivist GT continue to embrace and endorse.  
 
Points of Convergence 
 
The original textbook of GT (The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 1967) outlined that at 
the preliminary stages of a study, the researcher should only make choices regarding the 
initial gathering of data rather than predetermining the entire procedure of data collection 
from the outset of the study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser and Strauss (1967) contended 
that decisions regarding data collection cannot be entirely prearranged because the analysis of 
data will reveal the need for more data. This becomes evident at a number of stages 
throughout the research. Firstly, as data are initially coded and categorized, gaps will become 
evident, thereby identifying the specific need for further evidence in a particular sphere 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Secondly, during the simultaneous collecting, coding, and analysis 
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of data, unexpected concepts may emerge which change the direction of the study 
considerably, thereby redirecting the research, and necessitating further data-collection that 
could not have been anticipated in advance.  Finally, as the underlying hypothesis begins to 
surface, gaps in the emerging theory will become evident to the researcher, who subsequently 
identifies the specific need for further evidence in a particular sphere. As a consequence, the 
researcher’s progressive research sample will be guided by these unfolding identifications 
rather than predetermined at the outset of the study. Glaser and Strauss (1967) named this 
evolving process theoretical sampling. This procedure of theoretical sampling continues until 
the point of saturation, when the analysis has been exhausted and no new data are emerging. 
Significantly, these precepts remain intrinsic to Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT as 
they each contend that the research sample cannot be predetermined; instead, it must be a 
theoretical sample, dynamically led by the emerging theory until the point of saturation. 
The original GT methodology (1967) forged a very specific approach to analysing data 
which is underlined by the method of constant comparison. As raw data are meticulously 
analysed line by line, every incident in the data is coded with a conceptual label. These codes 
are collated into a plethora of categories denoting higher-level concepts. Glaser and Holton1 
identified that as the researcher is simultaneously collecting, coding, analyzing and 
categorizing data, she is engaged in three levels of constant comparisons (Glaser & Holton, 
2004; Holton, 2010):  
 
1) Codes are compared with codes, 
2) Codes are compared with emerging categories, and 
3) Categories are compared with one another. 
 
At the latter stages of research, Glaser and Holton (2004; Holton 2010) suggest that 
comparative analysis encompasses a final dimension (which the authors suggests could be 
depicted as the fourth tier of the constant comparative technique): 
 
4) The emerging theory is compared with the literature. 
 
Glaser and Strauss insisted that this dance of the collection, coding and analysis of data, 
punctuated by the beat of the constant comparison should “blur and intertwine continually, 
from the beginning of an investigation to its end” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 43).The 
constant comparison was a distinguishing characteristic of the methodology to the extent that 
GT was also known as the constant comparative method (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Giske & 
Artinian, 2007; Jones & Alony, 2011). Accordingly, this remains an essential precept in all 
three factions of GT as it enables the analyst to proficiently engender a theory that is credible, 
consistent, and closely integrated with the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
As well as pioneering the constant comparison, the original GT methodology also 
introduced the technique of memo writing. As concepts begin to emerge through the process 
of coding and constant comparison, the researcher reflects on the data by recording memos of 
her reflections, deliberations and conjectures. Recording memos is critical during this entire 
process as it “provides an immediate illustration for an idea” and serves to develop reflection, 
ideas, and codes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 108). Glaser and Strauss (1967) also stipulated 
that as the researcher begins to write a theory, it is imperative to gather all of the memos 
                                                          
1In The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Glaser and Strauss identify four stages of the constant comparative 
method: comparing incidents applicable to each category, integrating categories and their properties, delimiting 
the theory, and writing the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 105). However, the elucidation of this develops 
with increasing lucidity and coherence in Glaser’s successive publications. Consequently, the author will utilize 
these later publications to ensure clarity. 
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pertaining to each category, in order to have a succinct illustration of each concept, which in 
turn facilitates the theorizing process. Furthermore, they delineated that when it comes to the 
final stages of writing the research into a thesis or journal paper, the successive memos will 
provide the map for the researcher to articulate the journey of conceptualizing the data, 
wresting with complications, and eventually fashioning a theory. Thus, memo writing is 
intrinsic to GT methodology and continues to pervade Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist 
variations of GT.  
The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) also distinguished between substantive and 
formal theory. Glaser and Strauss originally cautioned that the process of generating a GT 
within a very specific arena, such as parental coping with an early diagnosis of their child’s 
hearing loss, yields a limited substantive theory applicable only to this specific field. The 
question of whether or not this theory has wider applicability, for example, parental coping 
with any trauma or coping in general, represents a leap from substantive (local) to formal (all-
inclusive) theory and necessitates a further study. Glaser and Strauss suggested that 
substantive theory is the bedrock for formal theory and advised that the researcher should 
focus on generating only one or the other during the course of a study (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). Significantly, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT continue to operate within 
this framework and maintain this distinction between substantive and formal theory.  
The above precepts (theoretical sampling, saturation, comparative analysis, memos, and 
substantive versus formal theory) signify quintessential characteristics of GT. These features 
are deeply embedded within the three derivatives which comprise the GT family. As a 
consequence, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT retain a familial resemblance.  
 
Points of Divergence 
 
Despite sharing fundamental GT tenets, Classic, Straussian, and Constructivist GT are not 
homogenous or interchangeable entities. Their incongruity essentially hinges on three 
principal demarcations: firstly their contending coding procedures, secondly, their opposing 
philosophical positions, and thirdly their contrasting use of literature. From a careful analysis 
of the literature, we argue that these three areas of contention represent the quintessential 
distinction between the three GT traditions.  
The remainder of this article will concentrate on these three distinguishing areas which 
demarcate Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT as diverging methodologies Firstly the 
coding conventions of Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT will each be investigated in 
turn. Secondly, the philosophical assumptions underlying each tradition will each be 
examined consecutively. Finally the contrasting use of literature will be explored within 
Classic, Straussian and Constructivist GT.  
 
Coding Conventions 
 
Classic GT: The Original Coding Convention 
 
While the basic coding procedure of the original Classic GT has been maintained, the 
presentation of it has developed with increasing lucidity. Glaser’s recent collaborative work 
with Judith A. Holton (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007), and Holton’s own publications (2010), 
present the coding procedures of Classic GT with a succinct clarity Glaser and Holton 
propose that the researcher approaches GT data analysis with a series of questions including 
“What is the main concern being faced by the participants?” and “What accounts for the 
continual resolving of this concern?” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 48). They asserted that 
the researcher wrestles with these underlying questions through the process of coding the 
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data, which Holton (2010) cohesively summarized as substantive and theoretical coding. As 
depicted in the diagram below, these two stages of coding precipitate the discovery of a GT: 
 
Figure 1. The Coding Procedure of Classic GT (Holton, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
These coding stages are imperative to Classic GT as they bind all the concepts of the 
methodology together and undergird the entire research process from conception to 
conclusion (Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton 2010). They are described in detail in Table 1:  
 
Table 1: The Coding Procedure of Classic GT (Holton, 2010) 
Stage Description 
 
 
Substantive 
Coding:            
a) Open 
Coding 
As data are collected and analysed line-by-line, each incident is coded with a key word, 
which synopsizes sections of data (Glaser & Holton, 2004). Coded segments are 
fragmented from the transcript, compared to each other, and grouped conceptually. These 
groupings (called conceptual categories) are given a conceptual title by the researcher, 
who forms as many conceptual categories as possible. The researcher engages in the 
three levels of constant comparison (as outlined previously). As new evidence continues 
to be gathered, compared, analyzed, and categorized, categories become dense and 
complex and their inter-relationships begin to become apparent. Subsequently, a 
principal core category (or core variable) will emerge. This will encompass the chief 
concern of the study, interact with most of the other categories in a significant capacity, 
and be sophisticated enough to account for the complexity and nuances within the data 
(Giske & Artinian, 2007; Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton, 2010; Jones & Alony, 2011).  
Substantive 
Coding:            
b)  Selective 
Coding 
The researcher reduces her focus to the core category and the categories which 
meaningfully relate to it. She engages in theoretical sampling and refines the interview 
questions accordingly (Jones & Alony, 2011). For the purpose of filtering out extraneous 
material, the collection and coding of incoming data is selectively restricted (or 
delimited) to focus exclusively on relevant data (Holton, 2010). As the researcher 
saturates these categories, the core category will become increasingly dense and its 
theoretical relationships with other relevant categories will become apparent. 
Subsequently, the researcher integrates (or reduces) the categories into higher-level 
substantive concepts to reach a higher level of conceptualization (Giske & Artinian, 
2007; Glaser & Holton, 2004; Holton, 2010; Jones & Alony, 2011).  
 
Theoretical 
Coding 
Theoretical coding comprises the final level of abstraction, as the researcher 
conceptualizes the inter-relationships of the substantive concepts. This gives rise to an 
emerging grounded theory that can “account for the relationships between the concepts 
thereby explaining the latent pattern of social behaviour” (Holton, 2010, para. 1). Glaser 
insists on trusting in emergence of a theory at this point in the research (Glaser, 1992). At 
this point literature should be employed as a comparison and conceptual mapping may 
also be utilised to facilitate this process (Giske & Artinian, 2007). Theoretical sorting of 
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The Classic GT coding procedure is underlined by the principle of the natural 
emergence of a theory to be discovered from the content of the data. Glaser insisted that 
while employing the coding procedure, the researcher should patiently “trust that emergence 
will occur and it does” (Glaser, 1992, p. 3-4; Glaser & Holton, 2004). Glaser conceded that as 
analysts are human, they inevitably have a natural tendency to unintentionally influence the 
research with personal biases or interpretations (Glaser, 2002). However, he argued that if the 
researcher carefully undertakes the coding procedures, rigorously employs the constant 
comparison technique, abstains from literature, and collects a large breadth of data from 
many different sources, the totality of these precepts will “correct for bias,” diminish the 
effects of the researcher’s personal input, and uncover the underlying “latent patterns” of the 
phenomena (Glaser, 2002, para. 24). Thus, Glaser argued that this will ultimately “make the 
data objective” (Glaser, 2002, para. 24).  
Despite his clarity with regard to methodological directives, Glaser was ambivalent 
about what research paradigm Classic GT corresponds to. However, Charmaz (2006), Bryant 
(2002), Jones and Alony (2011), and Madill et al. (2000) highlighted the implicit positivist 
assumptions imbued within the pursuit of objectivity and the assertions of the researcher’s 
unobtrusive discovery of a latent grounded theory within the content of collected data. 
Subsequently, these authors stress the connotations of a naïve realist ontology within Classic 
GT. They contend that Classic GT represents a “soft positivism” which proposes that that 
research entails “a process of revealing or discovering pre-existing phenomena and the 
relationship between them” (Madill et al., 2000, p. 4). This is the subject of much criticism, 
which will be examined later.  
 A number of authors have questioned the assertions of objectivity claimed by the 
proponents of the Classic GT coding procedure. Urquhart (2002) averred that the process of 
coding is inevitably “subjective” as the analyst collects, codes, conceptualizes, and collates 
the data according to his or her personal discretion (p. 272). The subjectivity of this process is 
inevitable as two researchers coding the same interview transcripts inexorably engender 
different conceptual categories (Madill et al., 2000). Moreover the researcher’s influence 
permeates every stage of the research, from choices of data collection at the genesis of a 
study, to discretionary conceptualization at the conclusion. Thus, rather than unobtrusively or 
neutrally discovering an emergent hypothesis, the analyst inevitably has an implicit 
interpretative influence in the entire process of generating a GT. Therefore, Classic GT can 
be critiqued as an inconsistent methodology as it employs an interpretivist coding procedure 
within an objectivist, positivist paradigm (Bryant, 2002, Jones & Alony, 2011, Kelle, 2005).       
 
Straussian GT: Coding with Structure   
  
Although Anselm Strauss was the co-author of the original Classic GT, Glaser and 
Strauss diverged in their academic affiliation, and published ensuing literature on GT 
methodology separately rather than conjointly (Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987).  By 1990 
Strauss co-authored a further exposition of GT with Juliet Corbin, titled The Basics of 
Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. This publication 
refined and edited specific aspects of the original (Classic) GT. In particular, Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) reconfigured the GT coding procedure. They designed a highly systematic and 
rigorous coding structure to create (rather than to discover) a rigorous theory which closely 
corresponds to the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1994, 1998). Strauss and Corbin classified 
four coding stages but qualified that the dividing line between each of the successive phases 
memos can retrospectively convey the progressive formulation of the theory in writing 
(Giske & Artinian, 2007; Holton, 2010; Glaser & Holton, 2004; Jones & Alony, 2011).  
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is somewhat artificial as the researcher constantly moves back and forth between them in 
consecutive coding sessions (1990). Significantly, this reformation of GT was so distinctive 
that it became known as Straussian GT. Their framework is illustrated in the diagram below:  
 
Figure 2. The Coding Procedure of Straussian GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
 
Strauss and Corbin’s robust procedure largely followed the same sequential 
progression as Glaser’s, but is far more meticulous and specified. They argued that their more 
specific and complex coding strategies were beneficial for a number reasons. Firstly, Strauss 
and Corbin elucidated that they were “designed to enhance the effectiveness of this 
methodology” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). Secondly, Strauss and Corbin conceded that 
their assiduous coding process may appear complicated, but they argued that this is 
appropriate because human life is complicated (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Furthermore, 
Strauss and Corbin explicated that the volume and precision of their specific coding 
directives were not intended to confuse the novice researcher. To the contrary, they were 
specifically designed to “spell out the procedures and techniques” in meticulous “step-by-step 
fashion” to assist “persons who are about to embark upon their first qualitative analysis 
project” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 8). Thus, their more specific coding directives were 
written for the purpose of enhancement and clarity, rather than confusion. The detailed 
coding process advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The Coding Procedure of Straussian GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
Stage Description 
 
 
Open Coding 
As described in Classic GT, the researcher begins data analysis by openly coding 
segments of data with conceptual labels to denote the concept they represent. Through 
questioning and the constant comparative method, these concepts are grouped into 
corresponding categories. During open coding, as categories become increasingly 
dense, the researcher may develop sub-categories. Furthermore, categories may also be 
subsumed under increasingly abstract, higher-order categories (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990, p. 61). 
a. Properties of each category 
As each category is developed and saturated, the range of properties (features or 
characteristics) within each category is demarcated (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
b. Dimensions of each category 
Strauss & Corbin specify that  properties pertaining to a category are scrutinized in 
terms of the category’s dimensional ranges, for example, the range of  frequency 
(often/never), the range of intensity (high/low),  the range of degree(more/less),  the 
range of duration (long/short),or any other dimensional ranges which are evident in 
data analysis (1990, p. 72). Subsequently, properties are located (or dimensionalised) 
along a continuum (called a dimensional continuum) thus giving each category a 
complex dimensional profile (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 70).  
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Axial Coding 
 
Axial coding represents the process of forging links between a category and its 
emerging sub-categories. They are connected through a very specific set of 
relationships outlined in the paradigm model. 
Paradigm Model 
The paradigm model demarcates five sub-categories within every category:                          
a) causal conditions, b) context, c) intervening conditions, d) action/interactional 
strategies and e) consequences. Each of these sub-categories has properties and 
dimensions. They are linked to the overarching category through the relationship 
specified in their title. This procedure reconfigures some previous standalone 
categories and refashions them as sub-categories to a higher-level conceptual category. 
Several overarching categories emerge through this process. They grow in density and 
precision and mature beyond their aforementioned properties and dimensions (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990).  
 
 
Selective 
Coding 
Selective coding encapsulates the process of integrating the categories with a higher 
level of abstraction, to fashion a GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As categories become 
dense, rich, and precise, their inter-relationships with one another become apparent. 
Subsequently, one dominant core category is selected which is broad and abstract 
enough to integrate the other categories and to cement the components of the 
phenomena (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Once the core category is selected, the 
researcher engages in five crucial steps (not necessarily in sequential order) to nurture 
the emerging concepts and engender “a picture of reality that is conceptual, 
comprehensible, and above all grounded” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117). 
a. Story line 
The researcher presents a “general descriptive overview” of the core phenomenon of 
the study; this descriptive story should be limited to a few sentences (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990, p. 119). The researcher should relate the storyline of the study in analytical 
terms, delineating the core category. 
b. Relating subsidiary categories around the core category with a paradigm 
The researcher employs the paradigm model to establish the relationship between the 
core category and its newly defined subsidiary categories. This ordering of a hierarchy 
of concepts will begin to yield an overarching theory. As Strauss and Corbin explicate, 
it takes the form of: “A (conditions) leads to B (phenomenon), which leads to C 
(context), which leads to D (action/interaction, including strategies), which leads to E 
(consequences)” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 125). 
c. Relating categories at a dimensional level 
The properties and dimensions within the core category will also be established. The 
subsidiary categories will be grouped and located “along the dimensional ranges of 
their properties in accordance with discovered patterns” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 
125). This occurs in tandem with the previous stage. 
d. Validating their relationships against data 
The emerging theory will be considered provisional until it is validated against the 
collected data to ensure that it is indisputably grounded in the collected material.  
e. Filling in categories that may need further refinement 
If there are any remaining “missing details” in the categories, the researcher employs 
theoretical sampling to fill in the gaps and ensure conceptual density (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p. 141).  
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Strauss and Corbin’s fastidious coding structure was criticized by both Glaser and 
Charmaz. Glaser (1992) contended that Strauss “misconceives our conceptions of grounded 
theory to an extreme degree, even destructive degree” (p. 3). In particular, Glaser contested 
the complicated coding instructions and protested that the researcher is effectively “forcing” 
the data into “preconceived” concepts in order to coerce a theory (Glaser, 1992, p. 3-4). He 
asserted that this serves to “interrupt the true emergence” of a theory and, as a consequence, 
the “true nature of the data is lost forever” (Glaser, 1992, p. 4). Similarly, Charmaz criticized 
that the Straussian GT encompasses an excessive “maze of techniques” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 
512). She argued that Strauss and Corbin transformed the “original flexible” coding 
guidelines into “immutable rules” which she characterized as positivist, rigid, narrow, and 
over complicated (Charmaz, 2000). Charmaz asserted that axial coding in particular results in 
“awkward scientific terms and clumsy categories” which detract from participants’ 
experiences and obfuscates analysis with excessive jargon (Charmaz, 2000, p. 525). She also 
undermined Straussian conceptual diagrams and maps, criticizing that they create an “overly 
complex architecture” that confounds the data and “obscures experience” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 
525). Significantly, several contemporary grounded theorists have supported Charmaz’s and 
Glaser’s criticisms and argued that the “densely codified operation” of Straussian GT is 
excessive (Goulding, 1999, p. 7).  
However, Strauss and Corbin defended their coding conception. Before these criticisms 
were even published, Strauss and Corbin had already clarified that their coding procedure 
should be applied flexibly and adapted to different circumstances and studies, a directive 
which Glaser and Charmaz overlooked in their critical analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Conditional 
Matrix  
 
The conditional matrix is not a fourth level of coding analysis; it is a “framework that 
summarizes and integrates” the previous three levels of coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990, p. 158–159). The matrix was designed as an “analytic aid” to assist the 
researcher in identifying the breadth of determining conditions and consequences 
related to the subject of study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 158). Strauss and Corbin 
specify that the matrix encompasses the following eight  levels of influence which 
range from a micro to a macro scale (1990, p. 163),:  
1) Action Pertaining to a Phenomenon 
2) Interaction 
3) Group, Individual, Collective 
4) Sub-Organizational, Sub-institutional Level;  
5) Organizational and Institutional Level;  
6) Community;  
7) National 
8) International  
The breadth of these successive levels ranges from the specific individual incidents to 
the general national/international scale (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The researcher 
utilizes the matrix by tracing a specific incident within the studied phenomenon 
through the successive levels of the matrix in order to ascertain the conditional path of 
the incident. This will help the researcher identify the significant conditions activating 
the phenomena, and/or the consequences arising from it. For example, the researcher 
takes a specific incident, such as a parent’s experience of receiving an early diagnosis 
of their child’s hearing loss with no after-care family support, and traces this incident 
through the matrix levels to ascertain the cause, the determining conditions, the 
manner in which conditions were manifested, and the resultant consequences (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). This may lead the researcher to the national level of the matrix to 
consider the government’s budgetary cut backs in health care.  
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Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin defended the complexity of their structure with a number of 
justifications. Firstly, they argued that the prescribed stages are critical to dispel the 
researcher’s prejudices and preconceptions which they inevitably bring to, and develop, 
throughout the study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Secondly, they asserted that employing the 
model will assist, rather than hinder, the researcher as it will facilitate an exacting and 
systematic analysis of data which will allow the researcher to relate concepts in a highly 
accurate, convincing, and complex capacity (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Finally, they insisted 
that this model allows the researcher to build a “rich, tightly woven, explanatory theory that 
closely approximates the reality it represents” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 57). Thus, Strauss 
and Corbin concluded that “unless you make use of this model your grounded theory analyses 
will lack density and precision” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 99).   
 Straussian GT did not remain a stagnant entity. Following Strauss’s death in 1996, 
Corbin continued to publish, and released a second edition of the Basics of Qualitative 
Research in 1998, a third edition in 2008, and a fourth edition in December 2014. Corbin’s 
successive publications relaxed the formulaic Straussian coding convention, and refashioned 
the underlying philosophical assumptions (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). However, she was 
careful to distinguish sections of the book that Strauss may not have been in accord with 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Significantly, Corbin’s reformation of Straussian GT moved the 
methodology in the direction of Constructivist GT.  
 
Constructivist GT: Coding and Contention  
 
Charmaz, a former student of Glaser and Strauss at the University of California, San 
Francisco forged a radical departure from both Straussian and Classic GT. She presented a 
third adaptation of GT coding, characterized by a distinctly constructivist philosophy. In stark 
contrast to Straussian GT, Charmaz (2008) resisted a concrete, rule-bound, prescriptive 
approach to coding, arguing that this stifles and suppresses the researcher’s creativity. 
Instead, she fashioned highly adaptable coding guidelines which endorsed an “imaginative 
engagement with data” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 168). Charmaz stressed the principle of flexibility 
in particular, insisting that the analyst must “learn to tolerate ambiguity” and “become 
receptive to creating emergent categories and strategies” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 168). As 
illustrated in the diagram below, she proposed a fluid framework, with “at least two stages” 
to coding (Charmaz, 2008, p. 159):  
 
Figure 3. The Coding Procedure of Constructivist GT (Charmaz, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charmaz’s constructivist coding procedure is punctuated by many generic GT techniques, 
including memo writing, constant comparisons, theoretical sampling, and saturation 
(Charmaz, 2008). Significantly, this framework, although vastly more malleable, is analogous 
with the two-tier structure of Classic GT.  Charmaz’s framework is elucidated in Table 3.:  
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Table 3. The Coding Procedure of Constructivist GT (Charmaz, 2008) 
 
 
Charmaz’s coding procedure is patently more interpretative, intuitive, and 
impressionistic than the Classic or Straussian GT (Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz placed a 
particularly strong emphasis on in-depth, intensive interviewing to purposely yield an 
intimate exploration of the meanings that participants attribute to their experiences (Charmaz, 
2006; Hallberg, 2006). Although these interviews are analysed through the constructivist 
coding procedure, the analysis rarely culminates into a prognostic or predicative theory 
presented at the conclusion of the research (Hallberg, 2006). Instead, a Constructivist GT 
study typically concludes with the researcher’s interpretative understanding (rather than 
explanation) of the studied social process which is presented in the form of a “story” 
(Hallberg, 2006). Constructivist grounded theorists argue that this narrative approach to GT 
does not neglect abstraction as it weaves conceptualization into description (Charmaz, 2006; 
Hallberg, 2006), particularly as the concluding story encompasses “categories, conditions, 
conceptual relationships, and consequences” (Hallberg, 2006, p. 147).  
Charmaz’s reconfiguration of GT was strongly criticized by Glaser. He opposed the 
constructivist emphasis on descriptive capture, asserting that it “denies and blocks” the “true 
conceptual nature” of GT (Glaser, 2002, para. 28). Glaser argued that the unequivocal 
objective of GT is conceptualization, rather than a faithful description of participants’ 
experiences (Glaser, 2002). Due to Charmaz’s emphasis on the latter, Glaser asserted that 
Charmaz is “misled” in considering her methodology to be a GT as a more accurate 
classification would be Qualitative Data Analysis (Glaser, 2002, para. 40). In contrast, 
Stage Description 
 
1) Initial 
or Open 
Coding 
During initial (or open) coding, Charmaz (2008) suggested that by employing Glaser’s 
two key questions, “what is the chief concern of participants?” and “how do they resolve 
this concern?” the analyst gleans an invaluable insight in to the collected data (p. 163). 
She proposed that the analyst codes for actions and potential theoretical cues rather than 
for themes. Charmaz advised that coding with “gerunds, that is, noun forms of verbs, 
such as revealing, defining, feeling, or wanting, helps to define what is happening in a 
fragment” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 164). This exposes “implicit processes, to make 
connections between codes, and to keep their analyses active and emergent” (Charmaz, 
2008, p. 164). Charmaz also proposed the generic GT use of in vivo codes, which 
encompasses utilizing the language of the participants as codes (2008).  
2) 
Refocused 
Coding 
The researcher moves into the next stage, re-focused coding, by identifying the codes that 
are recurring or particularly significant in illuminating the studied phenomenon 
(Charmaz, 2008). These codes typically have “analytic momentum” and are pertinent to 
“carry the weight of the analysis,” which is also described as having the ability to 
“capacity carry” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 164). The researcher elevates these codes as 
provisional theoretical categories which subsequently undergo selective or focused 
coding through the GT techniques of theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and 
memo writing (Charmaz, 2008). Memo writing, in particular, is vital to the process of 
constructing a theory. Through the medium of memo writing, the researcher can 
scrutinize the codes and categories, highlight determining conditions, and trace 
progression and consequences (Charmaz, 2008). The memos may also document “gaps in 
the data” and help develop conceptual “conjectures” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 166). Thus, 
writing and sorting memos captures the unfolding process of interpreting the phenomena 
and constructing a theory. 
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Strauss and Corbin upheld the value of description and shared a sense of obligation to give 
their participants a voice and “tell their stories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 281). However, 
Strauss and Corbin implemented this value within a rigorous and robust coding framework 
which stands in stark contrast with Charmaz’s flexible coding guidelines (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Strauss and Corbin also retained the goal of producing a “conceptually dense” theory 
at the conclusion of the study which could accurately account for relationships between 
concepts constructed from data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 278). Accordingly, Glaser 
criticized that the exclusive endeavor to theorize is compromised within Constructivist GT as 
it promotes narration to the extent that it is “neglecting the fundamental properties of 
abstraction analysis” (Glaser, 2002, para. 19).  
Glaser also rejected Charmaz’s underlying constructivist epistemology embedded 
within her coding procedure. He asserted that the interviewer and interviewee’s mutual 
construction and interpretation of data inappropriately elevates the researcher to the status of 
co-creator and composer of the story (Glaser, 2002). Glaser argued that this diminishes, 
rather than augments, the participant’s perception of a phenomenon, as it permits his or her 
experience to be recast by the researcher (Glaser, 2002). He insisted that this “unwarranted 
intrusion of the researcher” represents a gross violation of GT as it effectively renders the 
“researcher’s interactive impact on data more important than the participants” (Glaser, 2002, 
para. 8, 20). Glaser avowed that the participant’s perspective should always be paramount 
and should always correct and refine the researcher’s abstractions. As a consequence, he 
asserted that the researcher should “take great pains not to intrude their own views in the 
data” (Glaser, 2002, para. 14). However, Charmaz defended her position, asserting that it is 
impossible for the researcher to forge an unobtrusive relationship with social research as “we 
are part of the world we study and the data we collect” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 10). Ultimately, 
Glaser and Charmaz’s dispute hinged on epistemological differences: Glaser presupposed a 
neutral researcher with an unobtrusive impact on data while Charmaz averred the inescapable 
interactive impact of the researcher on data. These opposing philosophical positions (which 
will be analysed in the following section) are tangibly manifested in contending frameworks 
and criticisms of coding and data analysis.  
 
Contending Coding Conventions 
 
The three factions of GT encapsulate three distinct coding structures. The Classic 
framework retains and refines the original GT coding procedure which was designed to 
discover an emergent theory through systematic analysis of data (Glaser & Holton, 2004; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Holton, 2010). Straussian GT embodies a more rigorous and robust 
coding structure which was forged to create (rather than discover) a theory that closely 
apprehends the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Constructivist GT encapsulates a more 
impressionistic coding procedure which was fashioned to construct a conceptual 
interpretation (rather than exact apprehension) of the phenomena (Charmaz, 2006, 2008). 
Significantly, these divergent coding conventions arise from opposing philosophical positions 
embedded within competing research paradigms. Therefore it is essential to understand the 
philosophical presuppositions underlying the three traditions of GT.  
 
Corresponding Paradigms 
 
 There is ample debate in the academic literature as to which paradigm Classic GT best 
corresponds to. Bryant (2002) and Urquhart (2002) attested that the original GT texts were 
virtually silent on the questions of epistemology and ontology, which has continued to cloak 
the philosophical position of Classic GT in ambiguity. Glaser maintained that the 
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methodology itself was “discovered, not invented” and as such he resisted marrying it with a 
research paradigm, stating that it “stands alone, on its own, as a conceptualizing 
methodology” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 75, 39). Glaser primarily perceived GT to be a 
research method, which he divorced from philosophical considerations (Urquhart, 2002). He 
reiterated his position at a conference address, stating “Let me be clear. Grounded theory is a 
general method. It can be used on any data or combination of data” (Glaser, 1999, as cited in 
Urquhart, 2002, p. 47). As a consequence of Glaser’s philosophical abstruseness, Moore 
(2009) suggested that the covert epistemological assumptions embedded within grounded 
theory are not clearly articulated or defined, which has resulted in the “misinterpretation and 
misuse of the method” (p. 8).  
Charmaz addressed this ambiguity directly. She argued that, despite Glaser’s 
reticence, the original Classic GT appears to be closely correlated with traditional positivism 
as it implicitly assumes “an objective, external reality, a neutral observer who discovers data, 
reductionist inquiry of manageable research problems, and objectivist rendering of data” 
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). Charmaz traces Glaser’s inclination towards objectivism back to his 
formative experience as a graduate student at the Columbia University where Glaser was 
influenced by his rigorous quantitative and positivist training under Paul Lasarsfelt (Charmaz, 
2000). As explicated previously, a host of academics, including Bryant (2002), Jones & 
Alony (2011), and Madill et al., (2000), echo Charmaz’s assessment. Significantly, even 
Strauss, the original co-founder of GT, conceded the positivist nuances embedded within the 
terminology of discovering a pre-existent theory which emerges from “out there” (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994, p. 279).  
However, Charmaz’s assessment is not unanimously accepted. McCann and Clark 
(2003) argued that Classic GT is demarcated by an implicit post-positivist (rather than 
positivist) paradigm and underlined with a critical realist (rather than realist) ontology (cited 
in Moore, 2009). Urquhart (2002) also holds this position, which she attributed to the 
influence of symbolic interactionism from the inception of GT through the input of Strauss. 
However, Glaser himself later resisted this philosophy stating “GT became considered, 
wrongly, as a symbolic interaction method” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 38). He also 
objected that at times “grounded theory is considered qualitative, symbolic interaction 
research” which he described as “a kind of takeover” (Glaser, 1999, as cited in Urquhart 
2001, p. 16). Glaser’s rejection of symbolic interactionism, which encompasses a critical 
realist ontology and is a derivate of a post-positive philosophy, indicates his disassociation of 
Classic GT with Strauss’ more defined philosophical position. Furthermore, while Charmaz 
details Strauss’ considerable influence in weaving symbolic interactionism into the 
methodology of Classic GT, she affirms that it is Glaser’s “epistemological assumptions” that 
pervade the underlying philosophy of GT (Charmaz, 2006, p. 7).  
Glaser’s writing indicates his cognizance of his alleged positivist proclivity (Glaser, 
2002). Glaser cited Charmaz’s classification of his ontological and epistemological position 
in his article Constructivist Grounded Theory? (2002). He directly quoted Charmaz’s 
assertion that Classic GT assumes “an external reality” which is “independent of the observer 
and the methods used to produce it” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 513, as cited in Glaser 2002, para. 
18). In his lengthy citation, Glaser also referenced Charmaz’s avowal that Classic GT 
“follow[s] the canons of objective reportage” and culminates in an “objective stance” 
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 513, as cited in Glaser 2002, para. 18). Although Glaser proceeded to 
unequivocally criticize Charmaz’s handling of GT, he did not refute her identification of 
positivist connotations or challenge her classification of the objectivist ontology and 
epistemology embedded within Classic GT (Glaser, 2002). Instead, he responded with a 
defense of the GT techniques and methodology, contending that they serve to “make the 
generated theory as objective as humanly possible” (Glaser, 2002, para. 19). Thus, while 
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Glaser criticized Charmaz’s constructivist paradigm and her subsequent reinterpretation of 
GT, he refrained from contesting her classification of Classic GT as implicitly positivist. This 
reticence may be indicative of his acquiescence.  
Charmaz also argued that Strauss and Corbin’s rendition of Straussian GT is also 
undergirded with positivist assumptions. To corroborate her assertion, she highlighted the 
Straussian ontological presupposition of an external and objective reality, as well as the array 
of meticulous methodological procedures which, she argued, strive towards impartial data 
collection and espouse the precept of verification (Charmaz, 2000). Charmaz tempered her 
assessment with the acknowledgement that Strauss and Corbin’s position is more nuanced 
than that of Glaser, particularly given their incorporation of the participant’s story into the 
research, as well as their acknowledgement that the participant and analyst may not share the 
same perspective (Charmaz, 2000). Charmaz identified these distinctions (and others) as 
strands of post-positivism and traced this disposition back to Strauss’ exposure to the 
philosophies of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism as a graduate student in the 
University of Chicago (Charmaz, 2000). Despite Charmaz’s acknowledgement of these 
various influences and nuances, she ultimately asserted that, regardless of Glaser and 
Strauss’s divergence, both authors continue to retain a methodology “imbued with positivism 
with its objectivist underpinnings” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). Thus, Charmaz concluded that 
“both endorse a realist ontology and positivist epistemology, albeit with some sharp 
differences” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 513).  
However, Charmaz’s conclusion is disputable. Strauss and Corbin (1991, 1994, 1998) 
were very clear about their departure from a positivist realist ontology and unambiguously 
expounded a post-positivist critical realist ontology. While they affirmed that there is an 
external, objective reality, they clearly averred that the analyst’s grasp of it is limited, and 
“only God” can perfectly apprehend the “real nature of reality” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 
4). Strauss and Corbin asserted that the purpose of social research is to journey towards an 
“increasingly greater,” but not immutable, representation of reality (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, 
p. 4). Strauss and Corbin located their methodology within the philosophy of symbolic 
interactionism and pragmatism and emphasized their close affiliation with the philosophical 
writings of Dewey (1922) and Mead (1934). With this critical realist perspective, they argued 
that a “theory is not the formation of some discovered aspect of a pre-existing reality out 
there” but instead emphasized that theories represent “interpretations made from given 
perspectives” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 279). They attested that the “human grasp of reality 
never can be that of God’s” and as such all grounded theories are to some extent “fallible,” 
“temporarily limited,” and “provisional,” particularly as they are forged within a particular 
culture and time, and embedded in a specific historical context (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 4; 
1994, p. 279, 280). Ultimately, Strauss and Corbin’s assertions are consistent with a post-
positivist paradigm which contends that “although reality exists to be uncovered by inquiry, it 
is never perfectly apprehensible” (Ghezeljeh & Emami, 2009, p. 17; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
Strauss and Corbin’s flavor of post-positivism is very specific as the philosophy of 
symbolic interactionism and pragmatism pervade the methodology. These two philosophies 
are closely intertwined as symbolic interactionism originally emerged out of pragmatist 
philosophy (Jeon, 2004). One of the founders of the philosophy, Herbert Blumer, outlined 
that symbolic interactionism is underlined by three simple principles (1986). Firstly, he stated 
that “human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for 
them” (Blumer, 1986, p. 2). Secondly, he asserted that meanings are not intrinsically present 
within entities but that meaning is ascribed to objects, gestures, actions, and ideas through 
social interaction (Blumer, 1986, p. 3). Thirdly, Blumer posited that these ascribed meanings 
are always subject to modification as they are defined and redefined through an interpretative 
process (Blumer, 1986). This interpretative process consists of internal interaction with 
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oneself and social interaction with people, and also encompasses resultant actions (Blumer, 
1986). Strauss and Corbin (1998, 2008) embraced the symbolic interactionist perspective and 
depicted humans as active agents who reflectively act and interact with one another on the 
basis of interpreted meanings. They contended that the process of generating meaning is 
mediated though language, defined through interaction, and materializes into action (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998). Language, in particular, is the essential medium of this interpersonal and 
interpretative process. Thus, Strauss and Corbin embraced the symbolic interactionist 
perspective that “human beings respond to a particular situation through how they define that 
situation, rather than how the situation is objectively presented to them” (Aldiabat & Le 
Navenec, 2011, p. 1067).  
Strauss and Corbin also embraced the behavioristic philosophy of pragmatism which 
prioritizes the significance of the resultant action (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 2). Strauss and 
Corbin cite Dewey’s assertion that “the test of ideas, of thinking generally, is found in the 
consequences of the acts to which the ideas lead” (Dewey, cited in Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 
3). Dewey resisted the misconstrued dualism of knowledge and action, insisting that these 
entities are inextricably intertwined (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  He asserted that knowledge 
impregnates a new idea which gives birth to action, and that action may also give rise to new 
insights and knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). These principles are embedded within the 
action-oriented model of Straussian GT. Ultimately, as Strauss and Corbin asserted, 
pragmatism and symbolic interactionism are “easily recognizable as the framework for our 
own methodology” as Straussian GT is concerned with how participants interpret, act, and 
interact with the studied phenomena (Corbin & Strass, 2008, p. 2).  
  The significance and influence of symbolic interactionism and pragmatism receives 
increasing attention in Strauss and Corbin’s successive publications (1998, 2008). They 
explain that in earlier publications of their literature, namely the second edition of Basics of 
Qualitative Research (1998), their discussion of symbolic interactionism and pragmatist 
philosophy was removed by the editor, as the content was considered “too theoretical” and 
philosophical debates of research paradigms were not as prevalent at the time (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008, p. x). These deleted segments were later included in the 3rd edition of their 
publication (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Consequently, Strauss and Corbin’s (combined) 
successive writings on research philosophy, differ only in detail, rather than in philosophical 
position. Thus, the authors have quoted from the breadth of Strauss and Corbin’s combined 
writings on philosophy, without making chronological distinctions. 
Charmaz endorsed the principles of symbolic interactionism and pragmatism but 
criticized the Straussian post-positivist expression of it in their systematic coding procedure 
and critical-realist ontology (2006). In particular, Charmaz resisted its integration in the 
coding procedures, criticizing that the overly prescriptive regulations impinged on creative 
analysis. Thus, Charmaz proposed recovering the pragmatist and symbolic interactionist 
emphasis on meaning, language, interpretation, and interaction, by introducing them to a 
constructivist paradigm with a relativist ontology and a more interpretative methodology 
(2006).  
Charmaz clearly defined her ontological, epistemological and methodological position 
(2000, 2006). Her Constructivist GT is unambiguously underlined by a relativist ontology, 
which presupposes the existence of manifold social realities (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). 
Charmaz emphasized that her epistemological position unequivocally endorses the researcher 
and participant’s co-construction of knowledge and mutual interpretation of meaning, with 
the objective of fashioning an interpretive depiction of participants’ experiences (Charmaz, 
2000). Charmaz refashioned the methodology of GT by reclaiming the potent tools of GT 
from their positivist origins to forge a more flexible, intuitive, and open-ended methodology 
which dovetails with a constructivist paradigm (Charmaz, 2000).  Ultimately, Charmaz 
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argued that her alternative Constructivist GT not only “offers accessible methods for taking 
research into the 21st century” but also represents “a middle ground between postmodernism 
and positivism” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510).  
However, Charmaz’s depiction of Constructivist GT as a middle ground between the 
polarities of postmodernism and positivism is questionable. Charmaz’s Constructivist GT is 
closely associated with a postmodernist relativist ontology (encompassing many realities), a 
postmodern relativist epistemology (denoting a high influence of the researcher in the 
research), and a postmodern interpretative rendition of the GT methodology (salvaging it 
from its positivist roots). Consequently, rather than representing a middle ground between 
postmodernism and positivism, Charmaz’s constructivist paradigm is closely correlated with 
a postmodernist philosophy. This philosophical position is the subject of much criticism, and 
is neither exclusively contemporary, novel, nor unique. Relativism can be traced back to the 
Sophists (“educators in fifth- and forth-century BC Greece”) who propagated a relativist 
ontological position, advocating that “there is no absolute or objective truth, no truth that 
everyone must acknowledge” (Frame, 2008, p. 73). The Sophists advocated that “reality is 
what man thinks it is” and held “that there is no objective truth at all, but only truth “for me” 
and “for you.”” (Frame, 2008, p. 76, 73) In Plato’s literature, this ontological position is 
irredeemably undermined as Socrates accuses that “Sophists themselves are making 
assertions of fact. If there is no objective truth, then the Sophists’ positions are not 
objectively true” (Frame, 2008, p. 76). Thus Socrates exposes this position as contradictory 
and self-refuting (Frame, 2008). 
 
The Use of Literature 
 
As a result of their contending philosophical frameworks, the Classic, Straussian and 
Constructivist GT stances on the use of literature is divergent. Glaser and Holton (2004) 
recommended that when embarking on research, the GT analyst should suspend any pre-
existing knowledge from literature or professional/personal experience, to ensure an open 
mind, free of undue influences. This position encapsulates the positivist’s concern to remove 
the researcher from the research. Furthermore, Glaser asserted that it is essential not to 
consult relevant academic literature prior to, or during the process of, undertaking a GT 
study. He argued that prior knowledge “violates the basic premise of GT” as it clouds and 
compromises the analyst’s ability to perceive a dynamic new concept which has not featured 
in the aforementioned literature (Glaser & Holton, 2004, para. 46). Glaser advised that 
consulting the literature should be restricted to a constant comparison at the end of the study, 
at which point a specific literature review may be compiled if desired. Ultimately, Glaser’s 
position was inspired by the positivist “concern to not contaminate, be constrained by, inhibit, 
stifle or otherwise impede” the natural emergence of theory from data (Kelle, 2005, p. 31).  
 Strauss and Corbin challenged Glaser’s position. They encouraged the appropriate use 
of literature at every stage of the study, discerning the difference between an empty head and 
an open mind (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Kelle, 2005). They argued that the analyst’s previous 
experience and exposure to the subject, as well as a wide variety of literature may (and 
should) be employed throughout all phases of the research, from conception to conclusion 
(Charmaz, 2006, Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This is consistent with their post-positivist 
philosophy which accepts that the researcher inevitably influences the research. Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) maintained that a prior and on-going consultation with pertinent literature 
engenders manifold benefits: it reveals gaps in the academic literature; it can be employed as 
a secondary source of data; it can inspire questions; it can guide theoretical sampling; it can 
be utilised for supplementary validation; and it provides an insight into existing theories and 
philosophical frameworks. However, Strauss and Corbin’s engagement with the literature 
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was not unqualified. While they affirmed the use of literature at every stage of the research, 
they did not recommend an exhaustive and comprehensive prior review of all the relevant 
literature before embarking on research. They warned that “we do not want to be so steeped 
in the literature as to be constrained and even stifled in terms of creative efforts by our 
knowledge of it” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 50). Thus, while embracing the continuous use 
of literature, Strauss and Corbin also advised restraint, to guard against becoming so blinded 
by it as to prevent a new revelation of the studied phenomena. This is consistent with the 
critical-realist concern to strive for the closest representation of reality as possible.  
 Charmaz echoed Strauss and Corbin’s endorsement of literature but developed it a 
step further. She suggested that the literature should be compiled in a specific literature 
review chapter as well as interspersed throughout the entire thesis (Charmaz, 2006, p. 166). 
To guard against this danger of becoming immersed in literature to the extent of losing one’s 
creativity, Charmaz advised delaying writing a specific literature review chapter until after 
data analysis. She proposed that this resolution would facilitate a comprehensive literature 
review without compromising the researcher’s openness and creativity. She argued that a 
comprehensive literature review, compiled after data analysis, is efficacious for a number of 
reasons: it facilitates the researcher to enter into the dialogue of the pertaining academic field; 
it reinforces the researcher’s credibility, authority, and ensuing argument; and it can justify 
and explicate the researcher’s rationale in the ensuing chapters of the thesis (Charmaz, 2006, 
p. 166-167). Furthermore, the balanced approach of utilizing literature at every point of the 
research, but delaying total immersion until the end of the study, efficaciously augments, 
rather than asphyxiates, creativity. Charmaz’s position is consistent with constructivist 
philosophy, which insists that research does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is influenced 
and informed by the context in which the researcher is operating.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 It is essential for the GT researcher to comprehend both the principles that unite and 
differentiate the three GT traditions, in order to locate their research within a particular GT 
tradition and defend their rationale for selecting one tradition above the other two). 
Accordingly, the final diagram (Figure 4) on the following page provides a visual map to 
guide the researcher in this important endeavor:  
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Figure 4.  The Uniting and Differentiating Principles of GT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in the concluding diagram (Figure 5), the three traditions of GT are distinct 
entities. However, the researcher doesn’t necessarily have to adopt a pure form of one 
tradition, and indeed, within the parameters of consistency, there is freedom to blur the 
boundaries between Classic, Straussian, or Constructivist GT. In our personal experience, we 
began a research endeavor with a clear identification of Straussian GT as the guiding 
methodology. However, in the process of data collection and analysis, it became increasingly 
evident that while the underlining philosophical position was apt, the formulaic structure of 
Straussian GT coding was too rigid for this particular subject of study, which didn’t naturally 
fit into Strauss and Corbin’s prescribed paradigm model. Consequently, while retaining the 
philosophical foundation of Straussian GT, we relaxed the coding procedure to the extent that 
it resembled the coding instructions of Classic GT. Importantly, this did not violate the 
integrity of the methodology as Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) repeatedly insisted that their 
guidelines should be employed in a flexible capacity and adapted to best suit the unique 
dynamics of a study. Thus, while there are clear parameters differentiating the three traditions 
of GT, and the researcher needs to ensure a consistent approach, there is nevertheless room 
for creativity and flexibility within the execution of the selected GT methodology. 
 
 
 
Use Lit 
appropriately 
at every 
stage 
Use Lit at 
every stage & 
compile a Lit 
review 
Abstain from 
Lit until the 
very end 
Original CF 
designed to 
discover a GT 
Open-ended 
CF designed 
to construct    
a GT 
Rigorous CF 
designed to 
create a GT 
Soft 
 Positivism 
Post-Positivism & 
Symbolic 
Interactionism 
Constructivism & 
Symbolic 
Interactionism 
Classic          
GT 
Constructivist 
GT 
Straussian     
GT 
Legend for Diagram # 5 
• The purple circle encompasses the uniting principles which are embraced by all three factions of GT. 
• The three pink circles indicate the three areas of contention where the three traditions of GT disagree. 
• The blue boxes signify Classical GT positions  
• The orange boxes signify Straussian GT positions  
• The green boxes signify Constructivist GT positions  
• The pink arrows indicate the influence of one disputed precept on another. 
• CF is an acronym for Coding Framework; Lit is an acronym for Literature. 
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